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This su m m er began with events that raise serious qu e s ti ons abo ut the natu re
and pro s pects of Eu ropean integra ti on . On June 7, a referen dum in Irel a n d
rej ected the Tre a ty of Ni ce , wh i ch would have ex p a n ded the Eu rope a n
E con omic and Mon et a ry Un i on (EMU) to inclu de several new mem bers .
Abo ut a week later, the EMU summit in Göteborg was marred by the large s t
pro tests Sweden has seen in a gen era ti on . The pro te s ters den o u n ced what they
cl a i m ed to be the undem oc ra tic natu re of EMU and the neo l i beral po l i c y
regime it imposes on mem ber co u n tri e s . Coinciding with the summit was the
release of the Eu ropean Cen tral Ba n k’s (ECB) mon t h ly report showing that it
h ad lowered the forecast of econ omic growth in the eu rozone to 2.2 percent in
2 0 0 1 , as com p a red to the actual growth of 3.4 percent in 2000.A direct impli-
c a ti on of l ower econ omic growth is that the declines in unem p l oym ent wi t-
n e s s ed in the last few ye a rs might be absent this ye a r.
The po l i tical and econ omic con ju n ctu re in the eu rozone demands con c rete
and immed i a te rem edial acti ons from po l i c ym a kers . G iven the absen ce of
a ny significant fiscal policy initi a tive s , the on ly instru m ent of m ac roeco-
n omic policy ava i l a ble is mon et a ry po l i c y. This places an en ormous re s pon s i-
bi l i ty on the ECB and therefore it is wort hwhile to cl o s ely examine the
con du ct of this insti tuti on .
In this bri ef , Vi s i ting Scholar Jörg Bi bow analy zes the ECB’s perform a n ce
s i n ce the launch of the eu ro and the ef fects its policies have had on the new
c u rren c y ’s exch a n ge ra te vi s - à - vis the do ll a r. The beh avi or of the eu ro – do ll a r
exch a n ge ra te has def i ed conven ti onal ex p l a n a ti ons that attri bute exch a n ge
ra te movem ents to ch a n ges in the current account balance and interest ra te
d i f feren ti a l s . De s p i te the current account su rp lus that the eu rozone has ru n
up with the Un i ted State s , the eu ro has deprec i a ted . More striking is the fact
that the we a kening trend pers i s ted even in the face of i n terest ra te incre a s e s
i m p l em en ted by the ECB. An altern a tive ex p l a n a ti on , recen t ly in vogue wi t h
Pref aces everal analys t s , is that the rel a tively high er U. S . growth in outp ut and prof i t s
has led to a net outf l ow of equ i ty capital from the eu rozone tow a rd the U. S . ,
t h ereby put ting downw a rd pre s su re on the eu ro.
While equ i ty capital flows may have con tri buted to eu ro deprec i a ti on , a more
s a ti s f actory ex p l a n a ti on has to account for why the eu rozone is su f fering from
a rel a tive growth disadva n t a ge vi s - à - vis the Un i ted State s . Ma i n s tream econ o-
mists cite stru ctu ral probl em s , pri m a ri ly so-call ed labor market inflex i bi l i ty, a s
the main factor. Bi bow devel ops an altern a tive line of a r g u m ent that foc u s e s
on mon et a ry po l i c y.According to him,the weakness of the eu ro can be under-
s tood as a con ti nu a ti on of the downw a rd trend of the deut s che mark ; the lat-
ter was itsel f a manife s t a ti on of the bel ow - po ten tial growth re su l ting from an
ex trem ely ti ght mon et a ry policy stance . The Bu n desbank fo ll owed su ch a po l-
icy because it was exce s s ively con cern ed abo ut inflati on . Un fortu n a tely, t h e
ECB appe a rs to be su f fering from the same afflicti on .
Because gl obal financial markets assess co u n tries (or regi ons) according to
t h eir rel a tive growth pro s pect s , the eu ro has con ti nu ed to deprec i a te in spite
of the ECB’s interest ra te hike s . Su ch hikes have furt h er com prom i s ed
pro s pects of growth and hen ce the su s t a i n a bi l i ty of ti ght mon et a ry policy in
the futu re . The ti m e - i n con s i s tency of the ECB’s policy stance was recogn i zed
by the markets and the eu ro was pen a l i zed . Pa radox i c a lly, because of t h e
ex tent of c u rrency deprec i a ti on , the ECB’s ti ght mon ey policy had the oppo-
s i te re sult of easing mon et a ry con d i ti on s . According to Bi bow, the ex port
s ti mu lus deriving from this source was the driving force behind the econ om i c
recovery in the eu rozone from the middle of 1999 until the end of 2 0 0 0 , n o t
a ny su d den ch a n ge in stru ctu ral factors .
Bi bow argues that the current mac roecon omic situ a ti on , ch a racteri zed by
ex port - d riven growth and slu ggish dom e s tic demand growt h , is imbalanced .
Fu rt h erm ore , the app a rent slowdown in the U. S . econ omy is causing ex port
demand to shri n k . The key implicati on of his analysis is that mon et a ry po l i c y
foc u s ed solely on inflati on can impair growth and cre a te con d i ti ons that wi ll
u n dermine pri ce stabi l i ty in the futu re .
I trust that you wi ll find the analysis con t a i n ed in this bri ef i n s i gh tf u l . As
a lw ays ,I wel come your com m en t s .
Di m i tri B.Pa p ad i m i tri o u ,Pre s i d en t
August 2001
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At the start of 1999, a new policy regime was introduced in Europe that
included the launch of the euro and centralized control of monetary pol-
icy common to the 11 European Union (EU) countries that adopted the
com m on curren c y.1 This bri ef assesses the ex peri en ces of the new
regi m e’s first two ye a rs , p a rti c u l a rly the perform a n ce of the Eu rope a n
Cen tral Bank (ECB), the insti tuti on in ch a r ge of con du cting mon et a ry
policy for the euro area.
Several recent devel opm ents in the eu ro area stand out . On the one hand,
econ omic growth picked up markedly by mid 1999 and em p l oym en t
growth was qu i te impre s s ive :the unem p l oym ent ra te dec re a s ed by ro u gh ly
t h ree percen t a ge points from the ex trem ely high levels re ach ed bet ween
1995 and 1997. On the other hand, by Novem ber 2000 the new curren c y ’s
ex ternal va lue vi s - à - vis its major trading partn ers had fall en by some 20
percen t ,and inflati on had incre a s ed from a very low level to well above the
E C B’s decl a red to l era n ce level . Conven ti onal wi s dom vi ews the recovery in
o utp ut and em p l oym ent growth as driven mainly by stru ctu ral reforms of
l a bor market insti tuti ons and wage trends (OECD 1994; 1 9 9 9 a , b ) . Recen t
declines in unem p l oym ent were accom p a n i ed by downw a rd revi s i ons in
the esti m a tes of the non accel era ting inflati on ra te of u n em p l oym en t
(OECD 2000b). Th ere is a ten dency to vi ew the eu ro’s plu n ge and ri s i n g
i n f l a ti on as not direct ly rel a ted to mon et a ry policy itsel f , the ten or bei n g
that de s p i te these failu re s ,the ECB has done a “good job.”
This bri ef ch a ll en ges these vi ews and proposes an altern a tive interpret a ti on
of Eu ropean growt h ,pri ce , and labor market perform a n ce over recent ye a rs .
In con trast to the conven ti onal focus on labor market insti tuti on s ,a key ro l e
is assign ed to dem a n d - s i de factors as the driving force behind em p l oym en t
growt h .While a full assessment would have to also con s i der fiscal po l i c y, t h e
focus here is on mon et a ry policy and the evo luti on of m on et a ry con d i ti on s ,
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that is, ch a n ges in interest ra tes and the exch a n ge ra te . It is argued that the
eu ro’s plu n ge essen ti a lly re su m ed the trend of deut s che mark weakness that
h ad started in 1996 and that currency deprec i a ti on amounted to a sign i f i-
cant easing of m on et a ry con d i ti on s . In this way, “easy mon ey ” was intro-
du ced “t h ro u gh the back door ”of the Eu ropean fortress of s t a bi l i ty-ori en ted
policies and con tri buted dec i s ively to the ex port demand sti mu lus that lifted
Eu roland out of the do l d rums in 1999.
To some extent, the roots of euro weakness lie in the past: the low-growth
legacies of unsound macroeconomic policies inflicted upon the EU over
the 1990s. But the ECB made matters worse by failing to com mu n i c a te
effectively and coherently with financial market participants and playing
against the markets. The result was that any attempt to prop up the euro
by narrowing the current interest ra te spre ad vi s - à - vis the do llar wo u l d
fail if perceived by the markets as risking the eurozone’s growth prospects
and hence the ability of the ECB to sustain tighter money in the future.
Under such conditions, interest rate hikes might then weaken rather than
strengthen the currency. A more balanced and proactive attitude toward
growth and a medium-term orientation toward fighting inflation might
have both improved growth in the long run and reduced inflation in the
short run.
Af ter discussing some a pri ori difficulties in assessing the ECB’s perfor-
mance,this brief examines the convergence process of the 1990s and finds
that certain developments during this period played a significant role in
the euro’s plunge and the consequent problems faced by the new central
bank. The ECB’s performance is discussed next, with a focus on its ongo-
ing com mu n i c a ti on probl em and the impact on financial market s . Th e
analysis then turns to the ECB’s interest rate decisions and their effects on
the exchange rate and monetary conditions.
S ome Issues in A ssessing the ECB’s Performance
Monetary policy is generally held to affect the economy in complex and
not fully unders tood ways . It is wi dely agreed that in open econ om i e s
with flexible exchange rates, these effects arise mainly through two chan-
n els of tra n s m i s s i on : ch a n ges in the level of i n terest ra tes and the
exchange rate. Monetary policy’s performance measures are controversial.In principle,an assessment of central bank performance may focus either
on how skill f u lly policies are exec uted and com mu n i c a ted to ach i eve
s t a ted goals or the ex tent to wh i ch those stated goals were actu a lly
ach i eved . The ECB, for its own part , h a s , f rom the begi n n i n g, decl a red
that it wishes its performance to be judged only in terms of medium-term
price developments in Euroland (Duisenberg 1999, Issing 1998). That is,
it should be judged in terms of meeting its primary objective of price sta-
bility, defined by the ECB as a yearly increase in the Harmonized Index of
Con su m er Pri ces (HICP) of less than 2 percent over an unspec i f i ed
m ed iu m - term hori zon .2 This standard of ( ex post) eva lu a ti on raises a
number of problems.
One probl em is that no su ch med iu m - term record is yet ava i l a bl e . G iven
that the lag bet ween mon et a ry policy measu res and pri ces is com m on ly
h eld to be around one and a half to two ye a rs , an assessment of the ECB’s
perform a n ce on the pri ce front would have to focus on ly on devel opm en t s
s i n ce the latter half of 2000 and inflati on pro s pects over the next few ye a rs .
In addition, it may be misguided to focus solely on medium-term price
devel opm ents because this pre sumes that mon et a ry policy has no other
ef fect s . The con s en sus vi ew among econ omists is that mon et a ry po l i c y
affects real variables, such as output and employment, in the short run,
and thus economic welfare. Taking growth and employment into account
broadens and lengthens the basis for assessing the ECB’s performance, as
devel opm ents since mid 1999 might be seen as having been affected by
ECB actions.
A third probl em with the ECB’s standard is that it ign ores the role of com-
mu n i c a ti on in the con du ct of m on et a ry po l i c y. In practi ce , cen tral banks
h ave little difficulty con tro lling very short - term interest ra te s , but thei r
con trol over pri ces of o t h er financial assets is nei t h er direct nor guara n-
teed . G iven the paramount role of the financial sys tem in tra n s m i t ti n g
m on et a ry po l i c y, policy su ccess hinges on how well the cen tral bank guide s
m a rket ex pect a ti ons and percepti on s . Com mu n i c a ti on failu res may pro-
vo ke market oppo s i ti on and re sult in establishing mon et a ry con d i ti on s
de s i red by the market s ,ra t h er than those de s i red by the cen tral bank.3
By implicati on ,econ omic outcomes cannot be assessed as if t h ey are inde-
pen dent of the ef fectiveness of the com mu n i c a ti on of po l i c y. Mon et a ry
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the path that policy could take and sti ll be con s i dered su s t a i n a bl e .E f fective
com mu n i c a ti on of m on et a ry policy to currency markets and the pro s pect
that any shift in policy might have on futu re growth and inflati on are espe-
c i a lly important given that the ef fects of exch a n ge ra te ch a n ges are ref l ected
rel a tively qu i ck ly in both econ omic activi ty and pri ce s . Accord i n gly, com-
mu n i c a ti on failu res con cen tra ted in currency markets may qu i te easily dis-
ru pt mon et a ry policy and impose a mon et a ry stance different from the on e
i n ten ded by the cen tral bank.
These con s i dera ti ons move the eu ro exch a n ge ra te into the spo t l i ght of
the analysis. What effects did the euro’s plunge have on the economy and
h ow appropri a te was the ECB’s con du ct in vi ew of t h em? In what ways
has the ECB’s con du ct affected the eu ro and the current situ a ti on in
Euroland, and what are the likely developments during the next few years? 
P reconditioning the Euro ’s Slump: 
The Legacies of the 1990s 
Before ad d ressing these qu e s ti on s , t h ere are several wort hwhile re a s ons to
bri ef ly revi ew the time preceding the form a ti on of the Econ omic and
Mon et a ry Un i on (EMU), of f i c i a lly,the peri od du ring wh i ch econ omic con-
d i ti ons were to be improved and harm on i zed among co u n tries so that the
n ew currency could be launch ed against the back d rop of a stable econ om i c
envi ron m en t . F i rs t , the very severi ty of the eu ro’s plu n ge raises the qu e s-
ti on :why was the eu ro launch ed at a ra te that was immed i a tely perceived by
the markets as inappropri a tely high? Secon d , a m ong the EU econ om i e s ,
G erm a ny seem ed to be in parti c u l a rly deep tro u ble in spring 1999; this was
wi dely seen as the prime force behind the eu ro’s plu n ge . How did
G erm a ny—a co u n try whose currency had been a sym bol of econ om i c
s trength and whose cen tral bank was a para gon of policies foc u s ed on pri ce
s t a bi l i ty — get into this mess? Given that the con du ct of E U - wi de mon et a ry
policy is stron gly influ en ced by German vi ews and the ECB is model ed on
Bu n desbank standard s , it is intere s ting to examine that cen tral bank’s ro l e .
F i n a lly, a l t h o u gh the official claim in spring 1998 was that a su f f i c i en t
degree of m ac roecon omic conver gen ce had been su cce s s f u lly ach i eved
bet ween 1992 and 1997, i m m ed i a tely in 1999 and then again in the spri n g
of 2001 diver gen ce became a serious issue for mon et a ry po l i c y. Revi s i ti n g
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the conver gen ce process of the 1990s wi ll illu s tra te that the ECB started out
f rom a ra t h er difficult po s i ti on at the eu ro’s inaugura ti on and cl a rify that
the difficulties that then arose had important roots in earl i er devel opm en t s .
In a way, Germany was and still is central to all these issues. The striking
fact is that western4 Germany’s economic performance in the 1990s was
outstandingly poor: between 1992 and 1997, real GDP growth averaged a
meager 1.5 percent,job losses amounted to roughly 5 percent of the labor
force, and the unemployment rate nearly doubled. The key to the overall
outcome was the extreme tight-money policy pursued by the Bundesbank
throughout this period. By the turn of 1989–90, real short-term interest
rates had reached their peak of 5 to 6 percent, a level at which they were
kept even as the economy plunged into a deep recession by mid 1992—
the worst since the Second World War. Then, from September 1992 until
the tu rn of 1 9 9 5 – 9 6 , i n terest ra te cuts were implem en ted ex trem ely
slowly, but their expansionary effects were neutralized by currency appre-
ciation. Effectively, the ultratight monetary conditions remained roughly
unchanged for six years. In fact, the degree of monetary tightness became
even more stri n gent wh en fiscal policy em b a rked on an exce s s ively
re s tri ctive co u rse in 1992. As econ omic theory would pred i ct , this had
gl a ring real con s equ en ce s . Ca p ac i ty uti l i z a ti on dropped sharp ly in the
1992–93 recession and remained at severely depressed levels for most of
the 1990s. Un em p l oym ent con ti nu ed to soar until the end of 1 9 9 7 .
Depressed domestic demand reflected the severity of the tight monetary
and fiscal policies (Bibow 2001a, b).
The concept of a“monetary conditions index”(MCI) is very useful in this
context to assess monetary policy stance. The MCI is based on the theory
that in open economies with flexible exchange rates, the effects of mone-
t a ry policy arise thro u gh both the interest ra te and the exch a n ge ra te
ch a n n els of m on et a ry tra n s m i s s i on . E f fectively, an MCI com bines two
key indicators of m on et a ry stance , a short-term interest ra te and the
ef fective exch a n ge ra te , the two factors being wei gh ted according to thei r
rel a tive roles in the tra n s m i s s i on mechanism in their ef fects on aggrega te
demand and econ omic activi ty. The 3:1 wei gh ting here for the ra te of
i n terest and exch a n ge ra te ,re s pectively,means that a on e - percen t a ge - poi n t
i n c rease in real interest ra tes and a 3-percent apprec i a ti on of the real ef fec-
tive exch a n ge ra te (REER) are being tre a ted as having equ iva l ent ef fects on
a ggrega te dem a n d . The REER, in tu rn , m e a su res the real ex ternal va lue ofEasy Mo n ey throu gh the Ba ck Doo r
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a c u rrency in terms of units of a basket of forei gn curren c i e s , wei gh ted
according to their importance in foreign trade. The absolute value of the
MCI does not represent a measure of monetary stance. It merely indicates
wh et h er the stance has become more or less re s tri ctive rel a tive to some base.
F i g u re 1 illu s tra tes the evo luti on of m on et a ry con d i ti ons in Germ a ny
f rom 1995 thro u gh 2000 rel a tive to the first qu a rter of 1 9 9 9 . In spri n g
1 9 9 6 , a process of m on et a ry easing bega n , but this arose on ly thro u gh
c u rrency deprec i a ti on . A bri ef , m a i n ly ex port - d riven recovery started in
autumn 1996 as a result of the acceleration in U.S. and world economic
growt h . The ex ternal boost preven ted another outri ght rece s s i on (GDP
grew at less than 1 percent in 1996) and en a bl ed Germ a ny to meet the
Maastricht fiscal criteria and be admitted to participate in the EMU. But
reliance on external growth to compensate for deflationary conditions at
home is a risky strategy,as developments over 1998–99 showed.
In autumn 1997, the Bu n desbank tem pora ri ly arre s ted the deut s ch e
m a rk’s plu n ge by raising interest ra tes in a su rprise move .Most rem a rkably,
Note s: Fra n k f u rt O/N: Fra n k f u rt overn i ght interest ra te def l a ted by the con su m er pri ce
index; MCI:monetary conditions index;REER: real effective exchange rate.
S ou rce s: Fra n k f u rt O/N, con su m er pri ce index , and REER are from the Mo n t h ly Repo rt of
the Bundesbank.The data are also available at www.bundesbank.de.The MCI was calculated
by the author based on 3:1 weighting for Frankfurt O/N and REER.
Figure 1  Easy Mon ey thro u gh the Back Door: Cu rrency Wea k n e s s
and Mon et a ry Con d i ti ons in Germ a ny since 1995 (Base:1 9 9 9 : 1 = 0)The Ma rkets vs . the ECB
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m on et a ry con d i ti ons ti gh ten ed sign i f i c a n t ly after mid 1998. At this ti m e ,
the ex port demand shock that arose in the wake of the Asian and Ru s s i a n
c rises began to take its to ll on Germ a ny and the rest of Eu ro l a n d .
( In d i c a ti ons for an imminent slowdown in growth had been app a ren t
f rom spring 1998 on.) In re s pon s e , the Bu n desbank did n ot c ut intere s t
ra tes in a ti m ely way as had other cen tral banks (for instance , the Federa l
Re s erve and the Bank of E n gl a n d ) to avoid risks to econ omic stabi l i ty.
Furthermore, Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer publicly proclaimed
that the ex ternal demand shock would not affect stabi l i ty in Eu ro l a n d
(Hutter 1998a, b). If the prestige, reputation, and much-envied credibility
of the Bu n desbank were worth anyt h i n g, su ch upbeat “open mout h”
opera ti ons could on ly be seen as invi ting the deut s che mark’s apprec i a-
tion. This is exactly what happened and, as an unwelcome consequence,
the eu ro was launch ed at an inappropri a tely high level . Overa ll , the above
a n a lysis su ggests that far from amel i ora ting the econ omic mess in
G erm a ny,the Bu n de s b a n k’s mon et a ry policy du ring the 1990s was direct ly
re s pon s i ble for it. Thu s , modeling the ECB after the Bundesbank may not
have been a good idea.
Turning now to the issue of convergence, it should be noted that, just as
in Germ a ny, the accel era ti on in U. S . and world econ omic growth over
1996–97 proved critical in meeting the convergence criteria for most EU
countries. But five others—Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Portugal—
also benefited from favorable developments in monetary conditions over
the 1990s. The exchange rate crises of 1992–95 resulted in a marked shift
in external competitiveness within the EU, as this group of countries saw
their currencies decline by 20 percent or more against the deutsche mark.
The ex p a n s i on a ry ef fects of ex port growth caused by deprec i a ti on were
further amplified by interest rate easing in the latter half of the 1990s. The
f a ll in interest ra tes tow a rd the German level be s towed a dom e s ti c
demand stimulus on these countries, as the nominal interest rate spreads
between the Latin countries, for instance, and Germany fell from around
6 percent in 1995 to 0 by 1998–99. In some cases real interest rates even
fell bel ow the German level , s t a rting from ex tra ord i n a ri ly high levels in
1 9 9 5 . In line with the pred i cti ons of econ omic theory, ex port growt h
picked up markedly (relative to Germany) beginning in 1993. The labor
market situation improved by 1994–95 and, except for Italy, this group of
co u n tries ex peri en ced rapid and balanced growth spurred by dom e s ti c
demand in the latter half of the decade.A comparison between Germany and Spain serves to illustrate the degree
of d iver gen ce in mon et a ry con d i ti ons within the EU over the co u rse of
the 1990s. The mon et a ry con d i ti ons indices for the two nati ons (see
Figure 2) show the marked degree of monetary easing that took place in
Spain over the 1990s both in absolute terms and rel a tive to Germ a ny.
Monetary easing started three years earlier in Spain than in Germany as
the real effective exchange rate of the peseta fell sharply in contrast to the
u pw a rd movem ent in the German real exch a n ge ra te . The early ex port
s ti mu lus had improved the em p l oym ent situ a ti on by 1994–95 and was
boosting domestic demand. This process accelerated when Spanish inter-
est rates began to fall toward German levels. Not surprisingly, Spain was
in a better position than Germany to weather the international crises of
the late 1990s. Spain exemplifies a point of—to varying degrees—general
validity in Europe over the 1990s: ultratight money in the early years of
the dec ade and very easy mon ey later go a long way tow a rd ex p l a i n i n g
trends in macroeconomic performance.
The intern a ti onal crises of 1998–99 had a nega tive impact on all co u n-
tri e s , requ i ring a com m on policy re s pon s e .However, the situ a ti on wi t h i n
the eu ro area diver ged stark ly in terms of co u n tri e s’ ex po su re to the
s h ock and strength of dom e s tic dem a n d . While some co u n tries had
ach i eved a state of b a l a n ced and su s t a i n a ble growt h , o t h ers , e s pec i a lly
G erm a ny, were relying solely on ex port dem a n d .Hen ce the con s equences
of the external shock were asymmetrical across countries and the existing
degree of d iver gen ce was furt h er rei n forced . While the avera ge level of
euro area interest rates did fall in late 1998 due to convergence,5 the very
co u n try wh ere rel i ef was prob a bly most needed , G erm a ny, f aced both a
tightening of m on et a ry con d i ti ons and an espec i a lly sharp fall in ex port
dem a n d .
The history of d iver gen ce repe a ted itsel f by the tu rn of 2 0 0 0 – 0 1 , wh en
rel a tively high er inflati on in some faster- growing econ omies (Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands) was a major factor behind the ECB’s
dec i s i on to not cut interest ra tes in the face of a slowdown in ex tern a l
growt h , while Germ a ny was on ce again the hardest hit due to its free -
riding strategy of relying on external growth. However, before discussing
the ECB’s conduct in the face of the slowdown of late 2000, its response to
the eu ro’s plu n ge , wh i ch started immed i a tely after the new curren c y ’s
inauguration in January 1999, must be analyzed.
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The ill - con ceived mac roecon omic policies of the 1990s left Eu rope
stranded with a growth rate that was starkly low compared to that of the
United States.The key problems were the serious weakness of the German
econ omy, a nati on that accounts for one third of the EU’s outp ut , and sig-
nificant diver gen ce ac ross co u n tries in underlying econ omic con d i ti on s .
The prec a riousness of the overa ll situ a ti on was hei gh ten ed by the
Bundesbank’s blunders on the eve of EMU, setting the scene for things to
com e : the eu ro was launch ed from what qu i ck ly became vi ewed as an
unsustainably high level because the Bundesbank’s upbeat proclamations
about economic stability in the eurozone had been far off the mark, par-
ti c u l a rly in Germ a ny ’s own case (as ref l ected by the Eco n o m i s t’s [1999]
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Note s : RIR (G): Fra n k f u rt overn i ght interest ra te def l a ted by the German con su m er pri ce
index; REER (G): German real effective exchange rate; MCI (G): German monetary condi-
tions index; RIR (S): Spanish call money rate deflated by the Spanish consumer price index;
REER (S):Spanish real ef fective exch a n ge ra te ; MCI (S): Spanish mon et a ry con d i ti ons index .
S ou rces: Germ a ny: Fra n k f u rt overn i ght interest ra te , con su m er pri ce index , and REER are
f rom  the  Mo n t h ly  Repo rt of the  Bu n de s b a n k . The  data  are  also  ava i l a ble  at 
w w w. bu n de s b a n k . de . The MCI was calculated by the aut h or based on 3:1 wei gh ting for
R IR (G) and REER (G).
Spa i n : Spanish call mon ey ra te and con su m er pri ce index are from Fi n a n cial St a ti s ti cs
December 2000 (CD),published by the International Monetary Fund. The Spanish REER is
f rom the Bank of S p a i n’s web s i te (www. b de . e s ) . The MCI was calculated by the aut h or
based on 3:1 weighting for RIR (S) and REER (S).
Figure 2  Mon et a ry Con d i ti ons in Germ a ny and Spain,1 9 9 2 – 1 9 9 8
( B a s e :1 9 9 2 :1 = 0)Easy Mo n ey throu gh the Ba ck Doo r
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du bbing of G erm a ny as “the sick man of the eu ro” ) . The new curren c y
thus started on a distinctly negative note, and immediately zoomed in on
the deutsche mark’s (only briefly interrupted) downward trend that had
started in 1996.
As pointed out earlier, the German experience of the 1990s should raise
serious doubts about the apparently widespread hope that the ECB will
con du ct mon et a ry policy very mu ch the way the Bu n desbank did. It is
prob a bly uncon troversial that the two key issues in mon et a ry policy in
1999–2000 were pronounced euro weakness and the ECB’s ongoing diffi-
c u l ties in com mu n i c a ting ef fectively and co h eren t ly with the out s i de
world.In what follows,the hypothesis is made that these two issues might
have been more closely and deeply related than many observers seem to
appreciate.
The situ a ti on was made no easier by the provi s i ons of the Ma a s tri ch t
Treaty as to the Council of Ministers’ powers to formulate “general orien-
t a ti on s” for the eu ro (Art . 1 1 1 ; Ken en 1995), wh i ch led to irri t a ti on s
among and between finance ministers and central bankers. Occasionally,
these irri t a ti ons were con f l a ted wi t h , and furt h er magn i f i ed by, cert a i n
political decisions that were perceived by financial market participants as
“market-unfriendly”or displaying ambivalence about“structural reform”
( percepti ons gen era lly en co u ra ged by ECB procl a m a ti on s ) .6 The ECB’s
pre s i dent even tu a lly adopted the “ M r. Eu ro” ti t l e , and finance ministers
learned to coordinate and restrain their public utterances on the currency
(OECD 2000b, 6 1 – 6 2 ) . As it tu rn ed out , adopting that title attracted a
large degree of criticism.
It seems com pell i n g, t h en , to scruti n i ze caref u lly to what ex tent the
E C B’s con du ct might have con tri buted to the eu ro’s plu n ge , what the
con s equ en ces for econ omic devel opm ents in Eu roland were , and how
these devel opm ents have fed back into the ECB’s policy-making proce s s .
As a first step, the analysis of the ECB’s con du ct wi ll be carri ed out
within its own policy-making fra m ework , the two - p i llar stra tegy fe a tu r-
ing a qu a n ti t a tive “referen ce va lu e” for mon ey su pp ly growth and the
E C B’s “broadly based assessment of the out l ook for futu re pri ce devel op-
m ents and risks to pri ce stabi l i ty in the eu ro area as a wh o l e” ( E C B
1 9 9 9 c ) . As a second step, the analysis examines wh et h er the ECB’s inter-
est ra te dec i s i ons (derived from and ex p l a i n ed within its own stra tegy )The Ma rkets vs . the ECB
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gave rise to a ti m e - i n con s i s tency probl em that ef fectively impo s ed the
m a rket’s ra t h er than the ECB’s stance .
The first pillar of ECB stra tegy, the referen ce va lue for mon ey su pp ly
growth,is dealt with briefly here. The actual growth in money supply was
s i gn i f i c a n t ly and con s i s ten t ly above the referen ce va lue ever since the
euro’s inauguration.7 This is not really surprising,as the reference value of
4.5 percent was set conspicuously low, most probably because the figure
was meant to hedge criticisms of monetary restriction. Thus, a reference-
va lue overshot would ei t h er provi de an excuse for a ra te hike or be
“explained” as accommodating certain “special factors” that the ECB—at
its own discretion—decided would not pose any risk to price stability for
the time being.Strategic use of an apparent “rule” to fend off outside crit-
icism and en l a r ge (ra t h er than con s train) the cen tral bank’s own discreti on
is in line with Bundesbank traditions.
However, when the reference value was announced on December 1, 1998,
it was prob a bly not fore s een that above - referen ce - va lue mon ey growt h
would com p l i c a te matters wh en the ECB cut interest ra tes by 50 basis
points on April 8,1999. This was the ECB’s first policy move and was met
with great con f u s i on and con troversy (espec i a lly in Germ a ny wh ere
adherents to monetary targeting are less rare than elsewhere).8 As money
growth has remained above its reference value ever since, the ECB could
argue on later occasions that monetary policy was not restricting growth.
The situation became more complicated during the second half of 2000
when the ECB continued to raise interest rates while money growth was
a l re ady slowing markedly. To those who trust the rel i a bi l i ty of m on ey
growth as an indicator, this would seem to herald a marked slowdown in
GDP growth and raise doubts about why the ECB continued tightening
nevertheless. In any case, since only a few observers seem to be convinced
of either the usefulness of the reference value for money growth or its sys-
tematic role in the ECB’s strategy, the analysis may now focus on the sec-
ond pillar.
The ECB’s broadly based assessment of the out l ook for pri ce stabi l i ty in the
m ed ium term has been the pri m a ry source of com mu n i c a ti on probl em s ,
p a rti c u l a rly rega rding the role of the exch a n ge ra te .In deed ,the ECB’s com-
mu n i c a ti on policy has seen some rem a rk a ble shifts on this issu e . At the
s t a rt , it em ph a s i zed that the task of focusing on the mainten a n ce of pri ceEasy Mo n ey throu gh the Ba ck Doo r
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s t a bi l i ty in the eu ro area was “f ac i l i t a ted ”by the fact that the ECB’s stra tegy
did not em body any kind of exch a n ge ra te “t a r get” for the eu ro (ECB
1 9 9 9 c ) . Accord i n gly, du ring the first peri od of the eu ro’s decl i n e , l a s ti n g
u n til mid 1999, the ECB seem ed keen to down p l ay the rel eva n ce of this fac-
tor and its own con cern abo ut it. Nor did it cl a rify the issue in ti m e . E C B
pre s i dent Wim Du i s en ber g’s famous slip on the lack of an exch a n ge ra te
policy (“For the time being there is negl ect”) did not help to meet em er gi n g
ch a r ges of“ben i gn negl ect .”9
However, this charade did not last long and it became ever more apparent
that the ECB was highly concerned about the euro’s pronounced decline.
The fact that an experienced central banker like Otmar Issing, the ECB’s
chief economist, caused a stir in the markets in late 1999 by“appearing to
gloat that speculators had ‘burnt their fingers’ in the attempt to push the
eu ro bel ow pari ty ” ( “ Eu ro” 1999) illu s tra tes well how unnerving these
developments must have been for the people at the top of the ECB. The
eu ro then fell dec i s ively bel ow U. S . do llar pari ty (1 eu ro = 1 do llar) in
early 2000. Up to that point,the ECB had largely confined itself to the use
of “open mout h” opera ti on s , em phasizing the “po ten tial upside” of t h e
eu ro. But wh en the Federal Re s erve ra i s ed interest ra tes on Febru a ry 2,
2 0 0 0 , the ECB qu i ck ly fo ll owed suit the fo ll owing day, a panicky move
that did little to build up its alre ady bl em i s h ed market rep ut a ti on . A
whole series of interest rate hikes followed between March and October
2 0 0 0 , with eu ro weakness being incre a s i n gly cited ex p l i c i t ly as a key
underlying factor.
Finally, on September 22, the ECB organized concerted foreign exchange
m a rket interven ti ons in wh i ch it was joi n ed by the Federal Re s erve and
other G7 central banks. Their success in bolstering the euro proved rather
temporary because Duisenberg committed another blunder shortly after-
ward when he talked rather carelessly in an interview about the possible
f utu re use of forei gn exch a n ge interven ti on s . This incident led to the
most serious crisis so far in his presidency (with hopes for his resignation
being ex pre s s ed more ex p l i c i t ly and more wi dely than ever before , s ee
Barber 2000,“Wim’s Whim” 2000).
All in all, it seems hard to escape the impression that the ECB’s ongoing
failure to communicate effectively and coherently has contributed signifi-
c a n t ly to the curren c y ’s plu n ge . The failu re to cl a rify the role of t h e
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exch a n ge ra te at the out s et was a firs t - ra te policy blu n der in itsel f .
Wavering bet ween the appe a ra n ce of ben i gn negl ect and panicky po l i c y
m oves in re s ponse to exch a n ge ra te ch a n ges and interest ra te dec i s i on s
abroad, the markets were left with a wide range of possibilities to choose
f rom . This uncert a i n ty in tu rn com p l i c a ted the com mu n i c a ti on of t h e
E C B’s own interest ra te dec i s i on s . Perhaps most amazingly, de s p i te its
huge foreign exchange reserves,the ECB seemed all along unable to estab-
lish a cred i ble threat to intervene in forei gn exch a n ge market s , a thre a t
that would break market psychology and end what apparently presented a
one-way bet against the euro.
O f co u rs e , the verd i ct that the ECB’s com mu n i c a ti on with the out s i de
world has room for improvement is not really controversial. Even Issing
(1999) has admitted as much in his reply to outside criticism, suggesting
that “the verd i ct among most, i f not all , of our ‘ w a tch ers’ s eems to be
that—broadly speaking—the ECB has done a good job but has not been
very effective in presenting and explaining itself.”
This statement makes sense only if communication failures are of no real
consequence in establishing monetary stance. If that is the case, it is hard
to understand why so much attention is being paid to the issues of trans-
parency, communication, credibility, and reputation. Theory and practice
of central banking suggest that effective communication of monetary pol-
icy to financial market participants is a cri tical part of m on et a ry po l i c y
i t s el f . Com mu n i c a ti on failu res invo lve the risk of a loss of con trol over
policy. The ECB’s confusing behavior acted like a propagation mechanism
of euro weakness—as the markets took over.
Time - I nconsistent Policy, the Euro ’s Plunge,
and the Consequences
In addition to the ongoing irritations caused in currency markets by the
ECB’s incoherent behavior, another deeper layer exists in the relationship
bet ween the pron o u n ced eu ro weakness and the ECB’s com mu n i c a ti on
probl em s . Just as Germ a ny ’s poor econ omic growth had been beh i n d
the deut s che mark’s plu n ge since 1996, the pron o u n ced growth differ-
en tial bet ween the eu rozone and the Un i ted States was the basis for the
ti m e -i n con s i s tency probl em faced by the ECB. E con omic theory andavailable evidence suggest that, ultimately, the sustainable level of interest
ra tes in an econ omy depends on its ra te of growt h . By implicati on , i f
i n a ppropri a te mon et a ry policies lasti n gly con s train econ omic growt h ,
this in turn will constrain the sustainable level of interest rates and,hence,
the future course of monetary policy.
Ot h er cri tical policy implicati ons arise in an open econ omy. The faster-
growing econ omy ’s currency tends to apprec i a te because assets in that
econ omy gen era lly of fer high er pro s pective financial retu rns and thu s
en co u ra ge net forei gn capital inflows . Cu rrency apprec i a ti on provi de s
wel come disinflati on a ry rel i ef . By con tra s t , the slower- growing econ omy
ex peri en ces currency deprec i a ti on , wh i ch , while it has the ben eficial ef fect
of boo s ting ex port s , also produ ces inflati on a ry pre s su re s . Iron i c a lly, i n ter-
est ra te hikes inten ded to fight inflati on may do just the oppo s i te by ex pe-
d i ting furt h er currency we a k n e s s .
It is widely recognized that economic growth has represented the primary
theme in financial markets over recent years (Corsetti and Pesenti 1999).
Acting in this “progrowt h” envi ron m en t , the ECB has failed to grasp a
time-inconsistency problem: attempts to support the euro by narrowing
the current interest rate differential vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar may be coun-
terproductive if they are perceived as risking a widening (rather than nar-
rowing) of the growth differential ultimately underlying any sustainable
path of future interest rate differentials.In fact,the ECB’s aggressive inter-
est ra te hikes over the co u rse of 2000 appear to have been incre a s i n gly
perceived as risking Euroland’s growth prospects and thus lacking credi-
bi l i ty. This hypothesis of fers an ex p l a n a ti on for the paradoxical fe a tu re
that interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve tended to be good news for
the eu ro, while those by the ECB were bad news . A bri ef revi ew of t h e
course of developments will help to illustrate the issue.
Af ter its initial slide of s ome 7 percent since the start of 1 9 9 9 , the eu ro’s
ex ternal va lue stabi l i zed bet ween June and October (see Figure 3). Du ri n g
the su m m er, the eu rozon e’s growth pro s pects bri gh ten ed and, by Ju ly, t h e
E C B’s statem ents started to indicate a ti gh tening bi a s . Yet , du ring this
phase of eu ro stabi l i ty, the short - term interest ra te differen tial vi s - à - vis the
Un i ted States wi den ed (as the Federal Re s erve , a f ter its qu i ck easing in
1998 in re s ponse to growth ri s k s , s t a rted to ti gh ten aga i n ) , while the lon g -
term interest ra te differen tial shrank as eu ro bond yi elds ro s e . A revers a l
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s h ort - term spre ad fell , but the lon g - term interest ra te spre ad wi den ed
a gain (eu ro bond yi elds rem a i n ed stable) and the eu ro re su m ed its decl i n e .
In 2000, the same pattern became even cl e a rer with the ECB’s three 25-
b a s i s - point hikes of Febru a ry, Ma rch , and Apri l . The ECB su cceeded in
keeping the short - term interest ra te spre ad in ch eck as the Federal Re s erve
con ti nu ed its ti gh ten i n g. But if a nyt h i n g, the eu ro’s downw a rd drag seem ed
to gain new force from these hike s , with eu ro bond yi elds being set on a
declining trend (although falling more slowly than in the Un i ted State s
wh ere a inverted yi eld curve1 0 devel oped that was gen era lly attri buted to
p u blic debt redem pti ons and not perceived as heralding a rece s s i on ) .
In terms of the ti m e - i n con s i s tency probl em hypo t h e s i zed here , the ECB
f aced a ch oi ce . It could contain the short - term interest ra te differen ti a l
vis-à-vis the dollar in the short run while running the risk that this would
be perceived as unsu s t a i n a ble (by causing growth ri s k s ) . Or it could fall
behind the curve, in a sense, and derive support from improving growth
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Note s: E O N I A: Eu ro Overn i ght In dex Avera ge def l a ted by the Ha rm on i zed In dex of
Consumer Prices; REER: Real effective exchange rate of the euro;MCI: monetary conditions
index for the eurozone. The MCI was calculated by the author based on 6:1 weighting for
EONIA and REER.
Source: The European Central Bank’s website,www.ecb.int.
Figure 3  Mon et a ry Con d i ti ons in Eu ro l a n d ,1999–2000 
( B a s e :Ja nu a ry 1999 = 0)pro s pect s , in tu rn promising a more su s t a i n a ble basis for a ti gh ter mon e-
t a ry policy stance in the lon ger ru n .The latter stra tegy invo lved a med iu m -
term ori en t a ti on of w a i ting until the Federal Re s erve ach i eved its inten ded
s l owdown in U. S . growth and sti mu l a ting the dom e s tic demand that
would be needed once that slowdown materialized.A central bank single-
mindedly preoccupied with inflation risks would be naturally inclined to
opt for the former strategy.
The crucial point is that a market perception of an “antigrowth attitude”
may well prove counterproductive in both the short and longer runs. In
the short run, it might raise, rather than lower,inflation through facilitat-
ing currency we a k n e s s , wh i ch runs against the cen tral bank’s pri m a ry
concern. Even worse, by posing risks to growth and economic prosperity
( s oc i ety ’s pri m a ry con cern s ) , the cen tral bank’s myopic beh avi or may
h ave detri m ental lon g - run ef fects—an espec i a lly distu rbing pro s pect
since rising inflation may forestall any interest rate cuts in the event of a
slowdown.
A clear opportu n i ty for the ECB to bo l s ter the eu ro arose wh en the
Federal Re s erve’s 50-basis-point hike of May 16, 2 0 0 0 , was fo ll owed by
weak data on U. S . growt h , d a m pening market percepti ons of u n derlyi n g
s trength of the do llar and implying that U. S . i n terest ra tes had pe a ked .
The ECB missed this opportu n i ty by con ti nuing to play against the mar-
ket s’ pri m a ry them e , fo ll owing suit with a 50-basis-point hike on June 8.
The eu ro re su m ed its decl i n e .Most rem a rk a bly, the ECB con ti nu ed ti gh t-
en i n g, i m posing two 25-basis-point hikes on August 31 and October 5,
even in the face of m o u n ting evi den ce that eu rozone growth had alre ady
pe a ked and mon ey growth had begun to slow down markedly.1 1
In line with the ti m e - i n con s i s tency probl em hypo t h e s i zed here , it too k
confirmation of U.S. weakness to reverse the euro’s decline in November
2000. By the turn of the year, the euro had strengthened significantly, but
s oon afterw a rd , the ti m e - i n con s i s tency scen a rio re a f f i rm ed itsel f — i n
reverse gear. As U.S. gloom became global, the markets increasingly per-
ceived the Federal Reserve’s (forward-looking) quick easing approach as
m ore appropri a te than the ECB’s (back w a rd - l ooking) “wait and see”
i n erti a . The Federal Re s erve’s interest ra te cuts proved good news for the
do llar while the ECB’s relu ct a n ce to cut was bad news for the eu ro. Th e
eu ro we a ken ed aga i n . De s p i te Eu ro l a n d ’s rel a tively more favora ble short -
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a gainst itsel f . Its beh avi or was curi o u s ly rem i n i s cent of 1 9 9 8 , wh en the
Bu n desbank procl a i m ed that intern a ti onal crises would not have an advers e
i m p act on the German econ omy.
No do u bt , s ome of the con s equ en ces of the short run of ( m a rket - i m po s ed )
“easy mon ey thro u gh the back door ”a re high ly de s i ra bl e :em p l oym ent grew at
an impre s s ive pace and unem p l oym ent fell markedly.This is a crucial bl ow to
the conven ti onal wi s dom that Eu ropean unem p l oym ent is all stru ctu ral in
n a tu re . If the ECB, and not the market s ,were in ch a r ge of po l i c y, u n em p l oy-
m ent would have rem a i n ed unch a n ged ;this would be in line with the con du ct
of its su ppo s ed model—the Bu n de s b a n k .
Ot h er con s equ en ces are less de s i ra bl e . Cu rrency weakness pushed up
i n f l a ti on , an unti m ely event as it rei n forced pri ce pre s su res that had
re su l ted from soa ring oil pri ce s . With inflati on running well above its
declared tolerance level for the better part of a year, the ECB piled blun-
der upon blunder by refusing to respond appropriately to the slowdown
in world growt h , arguing that its mandate forced it to con cen tra te on
price stability alone.
Pa rt of the probl em was that even though overa ll mon et a ry con d i ti on s
were easy over the recent past, the balance of stimuli was suboptimal: the
eu ro’s plu n ge rei n forced the bias of ex tern a lly driven growt h , while the
E C B’s hikes con s tra i n ed dom e s tic dem a n d . With world growth slowi n g
m a rkedly, the old probl ems of dwi n dling growth pro s pects and diver-
gence reemerged with new force. However, two crucial factors that allevi-
ated the situation in the second half of the 1990s are not present today: a
significant tendency toward interest rate convergence within the EU and a
booming U.S. economy (Godley and Wray 1999).
Fu rt h erm ore , no size a ble discreti on a ry fiscal sti mu lus (as is curren t ly
underway in the United States) is expected to arise in Euroland. The 1998
shift of fiscal policy after six ye a rs to a less re s tri ctive stance (although
i m portant differen ces in degree and timing of fiscal ti gh tening were
i nvo lved) con tri buted sign i f i c a n t ly to the Eu ropean recovery in the late
1990s. The Maastricht rules may soon require Germany, in particular, to
respond to its reemerging fragility by tightening its fiscal stance—repeat-
ing the follies of the 1990s. This highlights that the Maastricht regime has
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seems determined to maximize its own anti-inflation prestige, accepting
an amazing degree of risk as society’s price. However, it may not be good
policy to imagine inflation risks around every corner but ignore real risks
to economic growth.
C onclusions
The euro’s plunge in 1999–2000 and the problems this presented to the
ECB had important earl i er roo t s . The ru nup to EMU du ring the 1990s
may have achieved convergence of inflation rates, but it also caused pro-
tracted fragility, in Germany in particular, together with significant diver-
gence in demand and growth. The Bundesbank’s final blunders of 1998 in
response to the international crises heightened the precariousness of the
economic situation at the euro’s inauguration, and encouraged what was
quickly perceived as a launch from a rather high starting point. This offers
s ome exon era ti on to the ECB, wh i ch , due to these unenvi a ble legac i e s ,
found itself in a difficult position right from the start.
Nevert h el e s s , the vi ew that the ECB has done a “good job” is simply
untenable. This brief has argued that the ECB’s policies were highly inap-
propri a te and acted as twofold prop a ga ti on mechanisms of the eu ro’s
plunge. First, its ongoing communication problem brought market psy-
chology up against the new currency and established conditions akin to a
one-way bet situation. Second, by misreading the progrowth environment
in which it was acting, the ECB ran into a time-inconsistency problem: its
aggressive interest rate hikes in defense of the sliding currency weakened
it furt h er, as they were perceived by the markets as risking Eu ro l a n d ’s
growth pro s pect s . We a kening growth pro s pects in tu rn underm i n ed
pro s pective retu rns on eu ro assets and the su s t a i n a ble co u rse of f utu re
monetary policy.
In tere s ti n gly, as the markets took over, overa ll mon et a ry con d i ti on s
became easier ra t h er than ti gh ter, i m posing “easy mon ey thro u gh the
b ack door.” One of the less de s i ra ble con s equ en ces was rising inflati on .
But the ECB is wrong to continue focusing on inflation only. Certainly its
vague mandate grants the ECB all the discretion it needs to take a more
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proactive attitude toward growth, which would have facilitated, not jeop-
a rd i zed , the mainten a n ce of pri ce stabi l i ty over both the short and the
medium term. Therefore, the true ECB paradox and ultimate proof of its
poor performance is that it failed its primary objective of price stability
exactly because it was too obsessed with it. Its failure to adopt a forward-
l oo k i n g, m ed iu m - term approach ra i s ed inflati on in the short run and
diminished the eurozone’s growth prospects in the long run. The ECB’s
perform a n ce has dem on s tra ted that there are clear risks invo lved in
granting independent central bankers discretion to focus on “price stabil-
ity above all else.”
N o tes
1 . In Ja nu a ry 2001, Greece became the 12th mem ber; while Den m a rk
dec i ded to stay out in a Septem ber 28, 2 0 0 0 , referen du m . Sweden and
the Un i ted Ki n gdom are the other two non p a rti c i p a ting EU co u n tri e s .
2 . Arti cle 105 of the (Am s terdam) Tre a ty on Eu ropean Un i on (T E U )
l ays down the E(S)CB’s “pri m a ry ” goal as that of maintaining “pri ce
s t a bi l i ty.” Un fortu n a tely, the tre a ty nei t h er defines what pri ce stabi l i ty
means nor specifies the con d i ti ons under wh i ch the ECB could not
refuse to pursue its “s econ d a ry ” goa l s , that is, the EU’s real obj ective s
as laid down in Arti cle 2 TEU. So it was all left to the cen tral bankers
to dec i de what suits them be s t . In tere s ti n gly, the ECB has meanwh i l e
re s o lved the ten s i on that arose from Arti cle 2 TEU, t h ro u gh sligh t ly
rewording Arti cle 105 TEU. In the October 2000 B u ll eti n the ECB
decl a res that its task is to fulfill the “cl e a rly def i n ed mandate to main-
tain pri ce stabi l i ty in the eu ro area a n d , in this way [sic] to con tri bute
to the ach i evem ent of the obj ectives of the Com mu n i ty ” ( p. 5 2 ;
em phasis ad ded ) . Any po s s i ble trade - of fs were el ega n t ly decl a red
n on ex i s tent in this way. No obj ective other than pri ce stabi l i ty
de s erves explicit con s i dera ti on wh en deciding mon et a ry stance . No te
the legal differen ce invo lved in the ECB’s and Federal Re s erve’s re s pec-
tive mandate s , with the Federal Re s erve’s fe a tu ring pri ce stabi l i ty a n d
f u ll em p l oym ent on an equal footing (Th orbecke 2000). In ad d i ti on ,
t h ere are marked differen ces in practi ces and atti tu des tow a rd outp ut
s t a bi l i z a ti on ,em p l oym en t ,and growt h .Easy Mo n ey throu gh the Ba ck Doo r
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3 . The com mu n i c a ti on issue in mon et a ry policy was em ph a s i zed by
John May n a rd Keynes (1936) in his Gen eral T h e o ry,p a rti c u l a rly in his
d i s c u s s i on of the mon et a ry aut h ori ti e s’ con trol over lon g - term ra te s
of i n terest fe a tu ring the po s s i bi l i ty of oppo s i ti on from the banks (see
Bi bow 2000).
4 . The situ a ti on in the form er East Germ a ny after unificati on was spe-
c i a l . Pa rti c u l a rly with rega rd to pri ce and wage tren d s , tod ay ’s com-
m on focus on all - G erman data gives a gre a t ly distorted pictu re of t h e
true situ a ti on in the early 1990s. But the point is that the ch o s en
m ac ro policies had ra t h er disastrous con s equ en ces in the West too.
5 . Just before the launch , in Decem ber 1998, the Bu n desbank orch e s-
tra ted its final interest ra te move ,a cut of 30 basis poi n t s .This all owed
Eu ropean short - term interest ra tes to conver ge at the new floor of 3
percen t . But from a German pers pective this minor and mu ch bel a ted
c ut just abo ut com pen s a ted for falling inflati on . The Bu n de s b a n k
( “ E con omic Scen e” 1 9 9 8 , 13) decl a red at the time that this move
would “cl a rify the intere s t - ra te hori zon for the fore s ee a ble futu re and 
. ..f ac i l i t a te the start for the Eu ropean Cen tral Ba n k .”
6 . A prime example here is German Ch a n cell or Gerh a rd Sch r ö der ’s
b a i l o ut of the bankru pt con s tru cti on firm Philip Holzmann AG in
Decem ber 1999, wh i ch attracted ra t h er explicit public cri ticism from
Du i s en ber g, who bl a m ed the measu re for causing eu ro we a k n e s s .
S ch r ö der bri s k ly rem i n ded Du i s en berg that the ECB was not in ch a r ge
of G erman po l i ti c s . One issue is wh i ch caused more damage : the su p-
po s ed market - u n f ri en dliness of the bailout or the open con f l i ct abo ut
it provo ked by the ECB. An o t h er issue is that Eu rope’s cen tral bank
po l i ticians are amazingly at ease talking well beyond their own mon e-
t a ry portfo l i o,but would rega rd equ iva l ent beh avi or by any dem oc ra ti-
c a lly el ected po l i tician as impinging on the ECB’s indepen den ce .
7 . The referen ce va lue of 4.5 percent was first announced by the
G overning Council on Decem ber 1, 1 9 9 8 ,and then revi ewed and con-
f i rm ed in Decem ber 1999 and Decem ber 2000. By providing nu m er-
ous caveats the ECB made su re not to bind its hands but to maximize
its own scope for discreti on (see ECB 1999b).8 . Com m en ting on the ra te cut in its April B u ll eti n, the ECB (1999c)
ex p l a i n ed that mon et a ry growth should not be seen as sign a l i n g
u pcoming inflati on a ry pre s su res “at this ju n ctu re ,” referring to unspec-
i f i ed “s pecial factors at the start of s t a ge three .”
9 . The rem a rk was made du ring a hearing at the Eu ropean Pa rl i a m en t’s
Su bcom m i t tee on Mon et a ry Af f a i rs on April 19, 1 9 9 9 . It was not the
on ly occ a s i on that forced Du i s en berg to “cl a ri f y ” his rem a rks later on
in order to limit the damage don e . In a speech on May 4, 1 9 9 9 , h e
ex p l a i n ed ,“ we do not have a target for the exch a n ge ra te of the eu ro,
for ex a m p l e ,a gainst the U. S .do ll a r.This does not mean, and it is good
to underline this on ce more ,that the ECB is indifferent to the ex tern a l
va lue of the eu ro or even negl ects it”(OECD 2000a,f n .3 6 ) .
1 0 . The yi eld curve is a plot of the interest yi elds on bonds that differ
on ly with re s pect to their term to matu ri ty,h aving otherwise iden ti c a l
ch a racteri s ti c s : ( default) ri s k , l i qu i d i ty, t a x , etc . In other word s , t h e
yi eld curve de s c ri bes the term stru ctu re of i n terest ra te s .A yi eld curve
“ i nvers i on” refers to a situ a ti on wh ere lon g - term yi elds fall bel ow
s h ort - term on e s , with the oppo s i te case being gen era lly con s i dered as
“n orm a l .”
1 1 . The Fi n a n cial Ti m e s of O ctober 6, 2 0 0 0 , fe a tu red a co lumn on the
“ E C B’s su rpri s e” that part ly iden ti f i ed the probl em out l i n ed above ,
ending with the proph etic ob s erva ti on that the ECB “risks giving itsel f
the rep ut a ti on of an inflati on - ob s e s s ed cen tral bank, wh i ch is wi ll i n g
to put growth at risk even wh en pri ce pre s su res are margi n a l . If t h i s
h a ppen s ,it wi ll lose po l i tical cred i bi l i ty and inve s tor con f i den ce .”
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